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ABSTRACT
Potential environmental, health, and safety (E,H&S) concerns associated
with all phases of the photovoltaic (PV) energy system life cycle are identi-
fied and assessed. E,H&S concerns affecting the achievement of National PV
Program goals or the viability of specific PV technologies are emphasized.
The report is limited to near-term manufacturing process alternatives for
crystalline silicon PV materials, addresses flat-plate and concentrator col-
lector designs, and reviews system deployment in grid-connected, roof-mounted,
residential and ground-mounted central-station applications. The PV life-
cycle phases examined include silicon refinement and manufacture of PV col-
lectors, system deployment, and decommissioning. The primary E,H&S concerns
that arise during collector fabrication are associated with occupational
exposure to materials of undetermined toxicity or to materials that are known
to be hazardous, but for which process control technology may be inadequate.
Stricter exposure standards are anticipated for some materials and may indi-
cate a need for further control technology development. Minimizing electric
shock hazards is a significant concern during system construction, operation
and maintenance, and decommissioning.
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SECTION I
INTRODUCTION
A. RATIONALE
A major goal of the National Photovoltaics (PV) Program, U.S. Department
of Energy (DOE), is to research and develop PV technology options that can be
transferred to the private sector for further development, process optimiza-
tion, and commercialization. For the near-term material option, crystalline
silicon, that goal is well within reach. Lessons learned at the various
national laboratories involved in PV research and technology development under
the National PV Program can benefit the PV industry.
An element of the Program is the requirement that the DOE develop tech-
nological options that are environmentally sound, and that comply with all
applicable regulations. The three main reasons for incorporating environ-
mental, health, and safety (E,H&S) research at the earliest possible time are:
(1) DOE is responsible under the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) to integrate environmental assessment activities at the
earliest possible time in research and development programs [CEQ
Regulations (40 CFR 1500-1598)]; NEPA integration is required to
preclude potential litigation.
(2) The cost of environmental compliance can be significantly reduced
if environmental analyses are incorporated early into research and
development, rather than being applied after technology development
programs are in place.
(3) Early and sufficient attention to environmental factors ensures
that occupational and public health and safety are not jeopardized.
This document identifies and assesses potential E,H&S concerns associ-
ated with the life cycle of crystalline silicon residential and central-
station PV systems. The document is intended to serve as a guideline for the
Government and industry to help identify potential problem areas.
Early assessments of the developing PV technologies identified a variety
of potential E,H&S concerns that have not been discussed in this report
because they have been either resolved or determined to be insignificant as a
result of programmatic research or advances in the technology. Only E.H&S
issues having potentially significant technical or economic impact either on
the viability of current PV manufacturing options or system applications are
addressed in this report. Those areas in which a cost reduction in the pro-
cess stream may be realized are noted, as are the many areas in which too
little information exists to perform an adequate sensitivity analysis on
potential process tradeoffs for environmental purposes. These may be prime
targets for further investigation. The document also notes that current
environmental regulations and legislative mandates can adversely affect the
development of PV technology if adequate E,H&S analyses are not incorporated
as part of the system design process. Finally, those areas in which regula-
tion is expected to be stricter in the future are identified. If standards
are made stricter, process step selection and control technology availability
or development may be affected.
All elements within the system life cycle are impacted to some degree by
environmental regulations. Regulatory impacts upon PV technology developments
range from requirements for the protection of worker health and safety during
all phases of the PV life cycle under Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSHA) regulations, to requirements for the environmentally sound disposal of
toxic or hazardous manufacturing wastes under Resource Conservation and Recov-
ery Act (RCRA) regulations. OSHA and RCRA and their implementing regulations
are two cost drivers which may significantly affect PV costs. Other statutes
having an as yet undetermined regulatory impact on one or more phases of the
PV system life cycle include the Clean Air Act (CAA), the Clean Water Act
(CWA), the Hazardous Materials Transport Act (HMTA), and the Safe Drinking
Water Act (SDWA).
B. SCOPE
This document identifies and assesses potential E,H&S concerns currently
associated with the fabrication, deployment, and decommissioning of PV systems
in terrestrial applications. The document is limited to crystalline silicon
technologies, and it discusses the entire life cycle of residential and
central-station PV systems: resource acquisition; cell and module fabrica-
tion; system deployment; system operation and maintenance; and system decom-
missioning. Both flat-plate and concentrator collector options are dis-
cussed. Figure 1 is a flow diagram of the PV system life-cycle phases
addressed in this report (shaded titles), including typical silicon material
production and PV module fabrication process options (listed vertically).
Material and process options still in the research phase are not
addressed in detail in this report. These material and process options
include, but are not limited to, thin-film technologies such as amorphous
silicon, gallium arsenide, copper-indium diselenide, cadmium sulfide/copper
sulfide, cadmium telluride, zinc phosphide, and a variety of other uncommon
materials.
The report is also limited to the E,H&S concerns associated with grid-
connected, roof-mounted, flat-plate residential systems and ground-mounted,
fixed and tracking flat-plate and concentrator central-station systems. These
two application areas serve to identify the primary E,H&S concerns associated
with PV systems. Other PV applications such as remote systems of several
hundred watts used to power ocean signal buoys, mountain-top radio and.micro-
wave repeaters, and water pumps in remote locations; intermediate systems of
from 10 kilowatts to 1 megawatt suitable for commercial, multifamily resi-
dences; and institutional applications, must also address E,H&S considera-
tions, but are outside the scope of this document.
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C. FORMAT
The four sections that follow discuss the major system phases of the PV
life cycle: silicon refinement and module fabrication, residential system
deployment, central-station system deployment, and system decommissioning.
Following these four sections of the report are a postscript, a glossary, and
a bibliography. Each section briefly describes the sequential activities that
occur during the system phase, and identifies and assesses the E,H&S concerns
associated with specific activities or processes. The section on module fab-
rication also addresses alternative module manufacturing options. Residential
systems and central-station systems are the primary applications for finished
modules. A summary matrix is presented at the beginning of each section for
clarification and to provide an overview of the material that follows.
SECTION II
SILICON REFINEMENT AND MODULE FABRICATION
SUMMARY MATRIX
This section discusses E,H&S concerns associated with silicon refine-
ment, PV cell manufacturing, and module fabrication. Table 1 summarizes
individual generic process steps, identifies the E,H&S concerns associated
with each step, and summarizes the assessment of those concerns. A generic
sequence of process steps that lead from raw silica to finished PV modules
includes silica mining, silicon material production, wafer production, wafer
surface preparation, diffusion, metallization, antireflective coating, and
module assembly.
Table 1. Environmental, Health, and Safety Concerns Associated with Typical
Photovoltaic Crystalline Silicon Module Manufacturing Processes
Process Step E,H&S Concern(s) Assessment
A. Silica Mining
B. Silicon Material
Production
1. Electric-arc Furnace
Reduction Substep
2. Semiconductor-grade
Silicon Refining
Substep
C. Wafer Production
1. Czochralski Method
a. Single-crystal
Silicon Produc-
tion Substep
b. Ingot Watering
Substep
2. Silicon Ribbon
Sheet Growth and
Watering
-Occupational exposure to
silica
-Public and occupational
exposure to Si particulates
-Occupational exposure to
silane and chlorosilanes
-Health and environmental
hazards from organic
solvents
-Evolution of hydrogen from
Si-slurry wastes
-Occupational, hazards from
lasers
AT
CA
Table 1. Environmental, Health, and Safety Concerns Associated with Typical
Photovoltaic Crystalline Silicon Module Manufacturing Processes
(Cont'd)
Process Step E,H&S Concern(s) Assessment
D. Wafer Surface
Preparation
1. Acid Etch
2. Alkali Etch
3. Plasma Etch
E. Junction Formation
1. Ion Implantation
2. Gaseous Diffusion
3. Liquid Dopant
F. Metallization
1. Electroless/Elec-
trolytic Plating
-Occupational exposure to
acids
-Health and environmental
hazards from acid wastes
-Occupational exposure to
alkalies
-Health and environmental
hazards from alkali wastes
-Occupational exposure to
uncharacterized plasma
effluents
-Occupational hazards from
RF radiation
-Occupational exposure to
phosphorus
-Health and environmental
hazards from organic
solvents (applies also
to 2. and 3.)
-Occupational exposure to
phosphorus
-Accidental occupational
exposure to phosphorus
-Health and environmental
hazards from organic sol-
vent wastes
-Health and environmental
hazards from plating wastes
AP
S
AP
CA
CA
S, CI
S, CI
CA
Table 1. Environmental, Health, and Safety Concerns Associated with Typical
Photovoltaic Crystalline Silicon Module Manufacturing Processes
(Cont'd)
Process Step E,H&S Concern(s) Assessment
2. Thick-Film Print
3. Evaporation
G. Antireflective
Coating
1. Chemical Vapor
Deposition
2. Liquid Coating
3. Evaporation
H. Assembly
1. Cell Intercon-
nection Substep
2. Encapsulation and
Module Fabrica-
tion Substep
3. Cell/Module Test-
ing and Handling
Substep
I. Non-silicon PV Col-
lector Manufacturing
-Occupational exposure to
metal inks
-Potential occupational
exposure to metal wastes
-Occupational exposure to
dichlorosilane
-Occupational exposure to
silicon nitride
-Insignificant
-Potential occupational ex-
posure to metal wastes
-Occupational exposure to
metal solders
-Occupational exposure to
encapsulant fumes
-Occupational shock hazard
from PV arrays
-E,H&S concerns are
unassessed
CI
U
N/A
U
CI
U
Key: AP = Alternative processes are available; Cost-benefits undetermined
AT = Alternative treatment methods are available; Cost-benefits
undetermined
CA = Current control technology is adequate
CI = Current control technology is inadequate; Cost impacts undetermined
NA = Not applicable
S = Stricter standards anticipated; Cost impacts undetermined
U = Toxicity, hazard, or safe exposure levels undetermined
A. SILICA MINING
SILICON REFINEMENT AND PHOTOVOLTAIC MODULE FABRICATION STEPS WITH PROCESS OPTIONS! ',
•.-.-.. . . • •.-.•...-.•.•.•.-.•.•.•.-.•.•.•.•.•.•.•.•.•.•. ••••••
A. SILICA MINING
• OPEN PIT
SURFACE MINING '
B. SILICON MATERIAL
PRODUCTION
• ELECTRIC-ARC
FURNACE/
SEMICONDUCTOR-
GRADE SILICON
C. WAFER PRODUCTION
• INGOT
• SILICON-SHEET
WAFER
CLEAN
D. WAFER SURFACE
PREPARATION
• ACID ETCH
• ALKALI ETCH
• PLASMA ETCH
, •'•'.•.•.•.•.•.:•.•.•.•.'.•.•.•.:•.••'•'•'
WAFER CLEAN
I
E. JUNCTION FORMATION
• ION IMPLANT
AND ANNEAL
• GASEOUS
• LIQUID DOPANT
WAFER
CLEAN
F. FRONT AND BACK
SURFACE METALLIZATION
• ELECTROLESS/
ELECTROLYTIC
PLATE
• THICK-FILM PRINT
• EVAPORATION
WAFER
CLEAN
G. ANTIRCFLECTIVE
COATING
• CHEMICAL VAPOR
DEPOSITION
• LIQUID COAT
• EVAPORATION
WAFER _
CLEAN
H. ASSEMBLY OF
FLAT-PLATE OR
CONCENTRATOR
MODULES
Silicon is produced from raw silica or quartzite, which is easily mined
from shallow subsurface deposits. The E.H&S concerns associated with quart-
zite mining include land disruption, surface mining occupational injuries, and
silicosis, a respiratory disease typically caused by chronic long-term expo-
sure to silica dust.
E,H&S Concern: Occupational exposure to airborne silica via inhalation
resulting in silicosis.
Assessment: Silicosis is a fibrotic lung disease caused by long-term
exposure by inhalation to respirable (less than 5 /j.m) silicon dioxide
particles. On-site dust control (e.g., by keeping the work area wet)
and use of personnel protection equipment such as particulate-filtering
can reduce worker exposure to silica. Silica mining attributable to PV
manufacturing needs for a full gigawatt peak of modules, however, would
constitute less than one half of 1% of the projected annual United
States demand for silicon for the year 2000 (Bureau of Mines, 1979)
[assuming 4 gm/WD, 53% silica processing yield for ribbon wafers, and
approximately 12/£ module efficiency at standard operating conditions
(SOC)]. Therefore, the E.H&S concerns mentioned are not likely to have
significant impact on the current or future PV industry.
B. SILICON MATERIAL PRODUCTION
{SILICON REFINEMENT AND PHOTOVOLTAIC MODULE FABRICATION STEPS WITH PROCESS OPTIONS! ;<
A. SILICA MINING
• OPEN PIT
SURFACE MINING
B SILICON MATERIAL
PRODUCTION
• ELECTRIC-ARC
FURNACE/
SEMICONDUCTOR-
GRADE SILICON
C. WAFER PRODUCTION
• INGOT
• SILICON-SHEFJ
WAFER .
CLEAN "
D. WAFER SURFACE
PREPARATION
• ACID ETCH
• ALKALI ETCH
• PLASMA ETCH
WAFER CLEAN
I
E. JUNCTION FORMATION
• ION IMPLANT
AND ANNEAL
• GASEOUS
• LIQUID DOPANT
WAFER
CLEAN
F. FRONT AND BACK
SURFACE METALLIZATION
• ELECTROLESS/
ELECTROLYTIC
PLATE
• THICK-FILM PRINT
• EVAPORATION
WAFER
CLEAN
G. ANTIREFLECTIVE
COATING
• CHEMICAL VAPOR
DEPOSITION
• LIQUID COAT
• EVAPORATION
WAFER
CLEAN
H. ASSEMBLY OF
FLAT-PLATE OR
CONCENTRATOR
MODULES
1. Electric-Arc Furnace Silica Reduction Substep
Silicon reduction and refinement begins with the crushing and
cleaning of raw quartzite to form high-purity quartz chunks. The chunks are
smelted in an electric-arc furnace with coke to produce metallurgical-grade
silicon (MG-Si).
E,H&S Concern: Public and occupational exposure to airborne partic-
ulates from arc furnace silica reduction.
Assessment: Electric-arc furnace reduction of silica may expose the
public and workers to airborne particulates of silica and fly ash that
form when the vaporized silica emitted from the stack cools to form fine
powders. These powders consist primarily of amorphous silica (Si02)>
which fall back into the work place or neighboring vicinity. To meet
primary and secondary National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS),
particulate emissions from silica refinement may be collected by bag-
house or other filtering mechanisms; however, no specific emission stan-
dards exist for this industry. Because many particulates are submicron
(0.1 to 4.0/im) (Vitrums, et al., 1977), it is difficult to capture all
particulate emissions. Average daily particulate concentrations of up
to 875 /ig/m have been measured in one work area (Gandel and Sears,
1977). To date, particulate emissions are well within allowable Clean
Air Act ambient air quality and OSHA industrial hygiene standards. The
current OSHA exposure standard for respirable crystalline silica is 10
mg/m3 [Toxicity Limit Value (TLV)-Time Weighted Average (TWA) for a
normal 8-hour workday or 40-hour workweek]. A new trial standard for
respirable amorphous silicon has been set at 3 mg/m [American Confer-
ence of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH), 1982]. The National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) has recommended
that the permissible exposure limit be changed to 50 /ig/nr (U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, 1978). With stricter emission
standards, high-efficiency particulate emission controls, such as gradu-
ated filter bag-houses connected in series, will probably be required.
Respiratory filters in the work area may also be required (U.S. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, 1972). Pollution control equipment
for electric-arc silica reduction has accounted for about 20% of capital
costs and 10% of operating costs of new silica reduction plants. If
stricter Si02 particulate standards are adopted, capital and operating
costs for silica particulate control could nearly double (Bureau of
Mines, 1981). Stricter silica particulate control requirements could
impact material costs for the silicon-using technologies addressed
within this document.
2. Semiconductor-Grade Silicon Refining Substep
In one process, MG-Si from the electric-arc furnace is reacted with
concentrated hydrochloric acid (HCl) at high temperatures (approximately
1000 C) in a fluidized-bed reactor to form mono-, di-, tri-, and tetrachlor-
osilane (Sit^ Cl, Si^ C^ , SiHC^, SiCl^) feedstocks. The chlorosilane
feedstock purified from MG-Si is converted primarily to liquid trichlorosi-
lane (TCS) by condensation separation. TCS, purified by multiple distilla-
tion, is mixed with hydrogen and fed to a deposition chamber where polycrys-
talline silicon (poly-Si) is deposited on a silicon seed rod.
E,H&S Concern; Accidental occupational exposure to chlorosilanes via
inhalation during chlorosilane production.
Assessment; Emissions of chlorosilanes can occur during silicon purifi-
cation. Chlorosilanes react with moisture in the air to form HCl. HCl
is highly corrosive, causes acute respiratory inflammation, and can
severely damage eyes and skin in high concentrations or after prolonged
exposure. If hydrogen-rich chlorosilanes predominate, a potential
explosion hazard also exists. OSHA standards for exposure to both HCl
and chlorosilanes is 5 ppm (parts per million) in air (7 mg/m^) (U.S.
Department of Health and" Human Services, 1978). Measurements in the
silicon purification workplace have indicated chlorosilane levels below
1 ppm in air (Owens, et al., 1980). Under normal working conditions,
exposure to chlorosilanes is not expected to be a significant concern.
A chlorosilane leak, however, may rapidly result in explosive ambient
concentrations. Because of the volatility of certain chlorosilanes,
current OSHA safety standards are considered inadequate (SEMI, Inc.,
1982). Standards are likely to become stricter in the future, which
means that additional controls and monitoring may be required. Associ-
ated cost impacts are undetermined.
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In a new refining method, MG-Si is converted to gaseous TCS in a hot,
copper-catalyzed, fluidized-bed reactor. Non-volatile metal-chloride
contaminants are drawn off at the dew point, and hydrogen is separated as a
non-condensable gas from the condensed crude TCS. The crude TCS is stripped
of dissolved volatile impurities in a stripping column. After a series of
conventional distillation columns and redistribution reactors, hydrogen-rich
silane (SiH^ ) liquid results.
Following distillation and redistribution, silane is pyrolized to remove
the hydrogen gas. Most hydrogen is recycled, but it may be burned. Pyrolysis
leaves a high-purity silicon metal powder that is consolidated by melting to
remove it from the process. Current control technology is adequate to meet
hydrogen and silicon metal particulate standards (Owens, et al., 1980). Stan-
dards are not expected to change in the near-term (ACGIH, 1982).
E,H&S Concern: Occupational exposure to silane via inhalation.
Assessment; Silane is toxic and highly volatile. Trial exposure stan-
dards have only recently been established (ACGIH, 1982). The adequacy
of these standards is now under study (SEMI, Inc., 1982). Silane is
being studied by the ACGIH to determine safe occupational exposure
limits (ACGIH, 1982). Additional process controls and monitoring will
be required if new and stricter standards are adopted. Cost impacts
resulting from stricter standards are undetermined.
C. WAFER PRODUCTION
fi\.f,' • „•!;<!!', '£ '#; - ' I SILICON REFINEMENT AND PHOTOVOLTAIC MODULE FABRICATION STEPS WITH PROCESS OPTIONS
A. SILICA MINING
• OPEN PIT
SURFACE MINING
I
E. JUNCTION FORMATION
' ION IMPLANT
AND ANNEAL
• GASEOUS
• LIQUID DOPANT
WAFER
CLEAN "
B. SILICON MATERIAL
PRODUCTION
• ELECTRIC-ARC
FURNACE/
SEMICONDUCTOR-
GRADE SILICON
WAFER CLEA
F. FRONT AND BACK
SURFACE METALLIZATION
• ELECTROLESS/
ELECTROLYTIC
PLATE
• THICK-FILM PRINT
• EVAPORATION
WAFER
CLEAN
C. WAFER PRODUCTION
• INGOT
• SILICON-SHEET i
X'XvX'XvX-XvX'XvX-
N
G. ANTIREFLECTIVE
COATING
• CHEMICAL VAPOR
DEPOSITION
• LIQUID COAT
• EVAPORATION
1. VVAFER _
CLEAN
WAFER
CLEAN
D. WAFER SURFACE
PREPARATION
• ACID ETCH
• ALKALI ETCH
• PLASMA ETCH
H. ASSEMBLY OF
FLAT-PLATE OH
CONCENTRATOR
MODULES
1. Czochralski Ingot Method
a. Single-Crystal Silicon Production Substep. Semiconductor-grade
silicon (SG-Si) is crushed and a dopant, usually boron, is added. It is then
placed in a quartz crucible where it is melted and a seed silicon crystal is
11
introduced. In an argon or helium atmosphere, a single-crystal SG-Si ingot is
slowly pulled from the crucible. Ingot-growing equipment is .periodically
cleaned with solvents.
E,H&S Concern: Health and environmental hazards from improper use and
disposal of organic solvents.
Assessment: Most organic solvents are flammable and are toxic to
humans, animals, and plants. Wastes improperly disposed of can contami-
nate ground water and drinking water. Some solvents are suspected human
carcinogens; their presence in contaminated drinking water supplies is a
significant health concern-(U.S. Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices, 1978). Wastes improperly discarded are also a significant fire
hazard. Toxic waste fires not only present immediate dangers of heat
and smoke, but can also spread harmful particles over wide areas. Dif-
fusion and metallization involve the use of large quantities of solvent-
based materials for applying, developing, and stripping photoresist and
mask materials (California Department of Industrial Relations, 1981).
Solvents typically used to remove surface wastes include acetone,
toluene, trichloroethylene, and xylene. These chemicals are commonly
used in the semiconductor and PV industries as solvents and degreasers,
and are used to clean equipment as well as the prepared wafers. New and
stricter OSHA standards have recently been adopted for acetone (reduced
from 1000 to 750 ppm) and trichloroethylene (reduced from 100 to 50 ppm)
(ACGIH, 1982; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1978).
Standards for xylene and toluene stand at 100 ppm; they are easily met
with existing control technologies. The solvents, however, are consid-
ered either toxic or hazardous under RCRA (see RCRA wastes in glossary
for EPA definitions of waste classifications). In addition, because
they are flammable liquids, they may no longer be disposed of in Class I
landfills, but must be incinerated or permanently destroyed by some
other method (RCRA, U.S.G. 42, amended 1980). Incineration is a very
costly procedure, especially if the wastes are contaminated with toxic
metals. Incineration costs range from $250 to $500 per ton and may cost
in excess of $1000 per ton for highly toxic phosphorus-contaminated
compounds (California Toxic Waste Assessment Group, 1981). Complete
implementation of this new RCRA requirement is expected to further
increase the control costs associated with solvent use. Cost impacts
associated with solvent control requirements,- treatment, and disposal
are undetermined.
b. Ijngot Wafering Substep. Prior to watering, the tapered ends of the
ingot are trimmed, and it is then ground to the desired diameter. Silicon
wafers are sliced from the ingot either by a multiblade slurry saw or an
inside-diameter diamond blade saw.
E,H&S Concern: Slurry wastes may evolve small amounts of explosive
hydrogen gas and cannot be handled by conventional methods.
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Assessment: Saw and ingot-trimming wastes constitute approximately
one-half of the original high-purity silicon input to the ingot process.
Only about one-third of this waste—the trimmed ends—can be recycled
within the process. Slicing ingots with an abrasive slurry generate a
sludge consisting of oils, clay, adhesives, solvents, alumina, silicon
carbide, and steel (Gandel and Sears, 1977).
When allowed to stand in a confined area, hydrogen gas evolving
from the waste sludge can accumulate to a dangerous concentration (SSD,
1982). Several slurry pipe explosions occurred before this problem was
recognized. Materials that produce explosive gases are classified as
ignitable by RCRA and must be disposed of in a secure landfill. Repre-
sentative costs of disposal for non-toxic RCRA solid wastes in
California are about $30 per ton (BKK, 1983; Kettleman, 1983), and
these do not include transportion or additional treatment. If the
hydrogen gas or gas-producing reactants are removed from the sludge,
however, it is not classified as ignitable and may be disposed of in an
ordinary landfill, or it may be safely recycled to industries that do
not require high-purity silicon, e.g., the steel industry. Current
California landfill disposal fees for non-hazardous wastes are about
fc4 per ton (Los Angeles Sanitation District, 1983). Hydrogen-gas pro-
ducing reactants can be removed from the saw sludge by rinsing it twice
with water. Ingot slicing produces approximately 1 gallon of abrasive
slurry per wafer (Chamberlain, et al., 1980). Sludge rinsing could
potentially double the volume of liquid/sludge saw wastes which still
must be handled and treated. An alternative to sludge rinsing, but of
undetermined feasibility, is to convey the sludge from the process area
on open conveyors and dry it in evaporative ponds, or dry it by land
spreading prior to landfill disposal. Land spreading costs approxi-
mately $6 per ton (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1979).
2. Silicon Ribbon: Sheet Growth and Watering
Silicon ribbon sheet methods of wafer production are relatively
new. Silicon ribbon sheets are pulled from liquid silicon by several pro-
cesses including edge-defined film-fed growth and dendritic-web growth. The
silicon sheets are laser-scribed and cut to form individual wafers. No pro-
cess emissions are produced in this phase (Owens, et al., 1980). If a laser
is used to cut or scribe the silicon sheets, workers must wear eye protection
equipment. Two advantages of sheet ribbon wafer production over ingot wafer
production are that none of the valuable silicon is lost as saw waste, and
that there are no significant associated effluent treatment disposal require-
ments or sludge-related E,H&S concerns.
E,H&S Concern: Occupational exposure to physical hazards associated
with lasers.
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Assessment: Lasers produce intense, concentrated beams of light that
can cause burns and eye injuries. Use of available process shielding
and personnel protection equipment such as goggles and face masks can
significantly reduce worker exposure to this physical hazard (National
Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements, 1971). Occupational
injuries caused by lasers are not expected to be a significant safety
problem for this process (Owens, et al., 1980).
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The raw silicon wafer must be cleaned and etched to remove oxidized
silicon, to remove saw damage (for ingot wafers), and to prepare the wafer
for further processing. Wafers may be "wet etched" with concentrated acid
or alkali solutions, or "dry etched" with gaseous plasma.
1. Acid Etch
In the acid etch process, hot, concentrated hydrofluoric or a
hydrofluoric/nitric acid (HF/tttK^ ) solution is used to prepare the wafer
surface. Plastic cassettes containing the wafers are currently manually
loaded into the etch tank. This process produces liquid-acid wastes and
corrosive silicon tetrafluoride (SiF^ ) and hydrofluoric acid gases.
E,H&S Concern; Accidental occupational exposure via skin and/or eye
contact with acid etchants .
Assessment; Acid burn hazards from hydrofluoric acid during the
transfer of wafers to and from hot acid baths are significant safety
concerns. Hydrofluoric acid is extremely corrosive and it is not easily
washed off the skin. It continues to corrode until diluted within the
exposed tissue or neutralized by calcium in bone. Acid burn hazards may
be minimized by use of tank shields and protective clothing. However,
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process automation would eliminate this worker-process interface and any
costs associated with acid injury and protective equipment as well.
Corrosive gas emissions are controllable and may be kept well within
allowable standards with available acid fume control equipment. Cost
impacts associated with automated versus non-automated etching processes
are undetermined.
E,H&S Concern: Health and environmental hazards from improper acid
waste disposal.
Assessment; Improper disposal of acid wastes can cause acid burn
hazards to the public, contaminate drinking water supplies, and lower
soil and water pH or change their natural chemistry so they cannot
support life. Acid wastes constitute one of the largest liquid effluent
streams in the semiconductor and PV component manufacturing industries
(Coleman, et al., 1981; Moskowitz, et al., 1980). According to RCRA
requirements, all concentrated acids must be neutralized prior to final
disposal. In addition to neutralization, fluorides must be removed by
precipitation with lime (CaO) for separate disposal as calcium fluoride
(CaF2). Neutralization and chemical precipitation costs range from
$50 to $350 per ton in California, depending upon the degree of
contamination by heavy metals (California Toxic Waste Assessment Group,
1981). Although no OSHA, CWA, or RCRA standards exist for calcium
fluoride, local water treatment municipalities are generally imposing
stricter standards on the amount of any fluoride compounds allowable in
industrial waste water because they can poison biological treatment
systems (Cartwright, 1982). Therefore, increased acid treatment costs
may be anticipated for most locations in the near future. Cost impacts
of local water treatment requirements for California's "Silicon Valley"
and other major locations for the semiconductor industry are
undetermined.
2. Alkali Etch
In the alkali etch process, concentrated sodium hydroxide (NaOH) is
used to prepare the wafer surface. As in the acid etch process, cassettes of
wafers are manually loaded into the etch tank.
E,H&S Concern: Accidental occupational exposure via skin and/or eye
contact with alkali etchants.
Assessment; Alkali burn hazards from concentrated sodium hydroxide are
significant safety concerns. Concentrated alkaline solutions are more
corrosive than most inorganic acids, e.g., nitric or sulfuric acids.
Strong alkalies gelatinize tissue forming soluble compounds, thereby
producing deep, painful burns. An insidious hazard associated with
alkali burns is that initial contact may not be painful; therefore,
severe damage may occur before the victim becomes aware of the expo-
sure. As with acid etchants, alkali burn hazards may be minimized,
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although not eliminated, by use of tank shields and protective cloth-
ing. Process automation would reduce alkali etchants as a safety con-
cern. Cost impacts associated with automated versus non-automated etch-
ing processes are undetermined.
E,H&S Concern: Health and environmental hazards from improper alkali
waste disposal.
Assessment: As with improper acid disposal, improper disposal of alkali
wastes can cause alkali burn hazards to the public, contaminate drinking
water supplies, and change natural soil and water chemistry by raising
the pH to a level where life cannot be supported. According to RCRA
requirements, all concentrated alkalies must be neutralized prior to
final disposal. Alkali treatment and disposal may ultimately cost less
than treatment and disposal of an equivalent volume of acids because
alkalies may be sold for the purpose of acid neutralization (Gallagher,
1983). Acids may also be sold for reuse. However, industrial processes
in general tend to use more acids than alkalies. Therefore, there are
more acids that must be neutralized than there are spent alkali solu-
tions to neutralize them. Consequently, alkali etchants may be prefer-
able to acid etchants because there typically is an existing market to
receive spent alkali wastes in most industrial locations. Alkali waste
treatment and disposal costs are comparable to acid waste treatment
costs, but they vary depending upon the degree of contamination by heavy
metals (California Toxic Waste Assessment Group, 1981).
3. Plasma Etch
Plasma etching, a so-called "dry-etch" process, is a new material-
saving alternative to wet-acid/alkali etching. Wafers are etched with carbon
tetrafluoride (CF^ .) plasma in a vacuum chamber. The plasma reacts with
oxidized silicon to form volatile reaction products that are removed by a
vacuum pump. An advantage of this process over wet etching is that it is
easily automated and eliminates the E,H&S concerns and costs associated with
treatment and disposal of liquid etchant waste streams. Plasma etching is a
relatively new process and the composition and toxicity of associated process
effluents have not yet been determined.
E,H&S Concern: Potential occupational exposure via inhalation or other
contact with plasma effluent stream.
Assessment: Plasma etchant effluents are primarily volatile reaction
products. The volatile products may include silicon tetrafluoride
(SiF4), silicon fluoride radicals (SiFx), silicon oxyfluoride com-
pounds (SiOF2, Si20Fg), oxygen (02), fluorine (?2^  > an<^ carbon
dioxide (CC^ ) (Owens, et al., 1980; California Department of Indus-
trial Relations, 1981). Some effluent species, particularly silicon
fluoride radicals, may prove toxic at low exposure levels because they
are highly reactive (Patty, 1979). In addition, no OSHA standards
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exist for occupational exposure to silicon fluorides or silicon oxy-
fluorides. If toxicity is demonstrated, occupational exposure standards
may be established. Control technology requirements and costs associ-
ated with this process cannot be determined until the waste stream has
been characterized and relative toxicity of its constituent chemical
compounds determined with respect to industrial hygiene guidelines.
E,H&S Concern:
radiation.
Occupational exposure to physical hazards from RF
Assessment : Plasma used in plasma etching is generated with a RF power
source. Occupational exposure to RF radiation is possible, although the
likelihood of such exposures occurring during this process has not been
determined (Moskowitz, et al., 1982). Little is known about the effects
of RF radiation on humans, but results from animal studies indicate that
a variety of changes in physical, nervous, and reproductive systems may
be caused by exposure to RF radiation (U.S. Department of of Health,
Education, and Welfare, 1979). The power source used for plasma etch-
ing, however, is typically below the standard set by OSHA for occupa-
tional exposure to this physical hazard (Owens, et al., 1980). Thus,
occupational injuries caused by exposure to RF radiation from this pro-
cess are not expected to be a significant health or safety problem.
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The junction formation process creates the p-n junction within the sili-
con crystal, enabling the cell to produce electricity. Junction formation is
typically performed by one of three methods: ion implantation, gaseous dif-
fusion, or liquid (polymer) dopant.
17
1. Ion Implantation
Phosphorus dopant ions from a gaseous compound (PHg, PF5) or
the solid element (P) are implanted into the silicon wafer by an automated
closed vacuum chamber process. Following implant, the wafer must be annealed
(by pulse electron, furnace, or laser pulse) to repair damage to the crystal
structure caused by ion implantation.
E,H&S Concern: Occupational exposure to toxic phosphorus compounds via
inhalation.
Assessment: Although only small amounts of phosphorus dopants are used
in this process, and emissions are likely to be minimal, the phosphorus
material options available are all toxic at extremely low levels (Owens,
et al., 1980). OSHA toxicity limit values (TLVs) vary from 0.1 ppm to
0.3 ppm (ACGIH, 1982). In addition, phosphine (P%) is identified as
an acute hazardous chemical under RCRA, CAA and CWA, and may have to be
treated and disposed of under strict guidelines. Highly sophisticated
control and monitoring devices have been developed by the semiconductor
industry to prevent and detect even minimal leaks of toxic dopants in
the event of a vacuum failure or other accident. However, due to the
extreme toxicity of these materials, monitoring response and warning
time is not adequate to prevent acute exposure to toxic phosphorus com-
pounds in an emergency (SSD, 1982).
Annealing after ion implantation leaves an oxidized layer on the
cells. This layer can only be removed by dilute hydrofluoric acid. Gaseous
and liquid dopant diffusion leaves a phosphorus oxide (PO) glass layer on the
cells and on the glass diffusion tubes in the gaseous diffusion process.
Phosphorus glass is removed from cells by a sequence of front-surface mask
application followed by back-surface etch with concentrated HF/HN03 acid to
remove PO glass and to etch silicon and remove the unwanted back-surface
junction. The front mask is then removed with a strong solvent, and finally
etched with dilute hydrofluoric acid (10%) to remove the remaining PO glass
from the front surface. Prior to the next process phase, the cells must be
cleaned with distilled deionized water, and in some cases detergent followed
by distilled water, to remove residual acids and solvents.
E,H&S Concern; Health and environmental hazards from improper use and
disposal of acids and organic solvents.
Assessment: See discussion in Section II.C.I.a.
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2. Gaseous Diffusion
A diffusion furnace is used to dope cell surfaces with a phosphorus
dopant (typically phosphorus oxychloride) and form the p-n junction.
E,H&S Concern; Occupational exposure to toxic phosphorus compounds via
inhalation .
Assessment : Exposure standards for phosphorus oxychloride
have only recently been adopted (ACGIH, 1982). As interpreted by these
standards, POC13 is more toxic (TLV =0.1 ppm) than PH3 (TLV =0.3
ppm) . Solid phosphorus (P) toxicity falls between POC13 and PH3.
Since POCl^ standards have been adopted, it may also be added to
RCRA's acute hazardous chemical list. Therefore, if control and dis-
posal requirements for these dopants become stricter, costs associated
with their use will undoubtedly also increase. Alternatively, less
toxic, and hence less costly dopant material alternatives may be invest-
igated. Control requirements and cost impacts associated with newly
adopted standards are undetermined.
3. Liquid Dopant
An alcohol or water-based phosphorus-containing dopant is either
spun, roller-coated, sprayed, or meniscus-coated onto the cell. Cells are
baked dry and then diffused in a convection or infrared furnace at about
900°C. One of the liquid dopants used is phosphoric acid (F^ PO^ .) , made by
adding water to anhydrous phosphorus pentoxide (P205) just prior to use.
E,H&S Concern: Accidental occupational exposure via skin contact with
phosphorus.
Assessment ; At present, no OSHA or RCRA standards exist for phosphorus
pentoxide. Because phosphoric acid is formed immediately, it can result
in severe phosphorus burns on contact with tissue. Phosphoric acid has
a toxicity comparable to sulfuric and hydrochloric acids, but it is
nearly ten times less toxic (based on TLV standards) than alternative
phosphorus dopants. Although extreme caution should be used when hand-
ling either phosphorus pentoxide or phosphoric acid, only small amounts
of either material are used (Gallagher, 1983). The liquid-dopant dif-
fusion process can be made continuous and automated. Consequently,
potential worker exposure to liquid phosphorus dopants is likely to be
minimal.
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Wafers are metallized to form a back-surface field and back contact and
a patterned front-surface current-carrying grid. Metallization is accom-
plished either by one process or a combination of processes including electro-
less or electrolytic plating, thick-film printing, and evaporation.
1. Electroless/Electrolytic Plating
A photoresist is applied to a clean wafer. The wafer is then baked
to remove excess solvent, covered with a mask defining the metallization pat-
tern, and exposed to a light source to polymerize the resist. The mask is
removed and the wafer baked a second time. Acetone is used to remove the
unwanted and unfixed resist from the area to be plated. The wafer is then
plated with nickel, palladium, copper, or silver. After plating, the polymer-
ized resist is removed with a strong solvent such as toluene or xylene.
E,H&S Concern: Health and environmental hazards from improper disposal
of organic solvents.
Assessment: See discussion in Section II.C.I.a.
E,H&S Concern: Health and environmental hazards from improper disposal
of plating wastes.
Assessment: Plating wastes contain heavy metals that may be bioaccumu-
lated by humans, animals, and plants, where they can poison vital bio-
logical systems. Spent plating wastes are classified as hazardous
wastes under RCRA; they are toxic and/or chemically reactive. Spent
plating wastes constitute one of the largest liquid effluent waste
streams in the semiconductor and PV industries (Coleman, et al., 1979;
Moskowitz, et al., 1980). In addition, although the electronic
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component industries (Standard Industrial Classification 3600) produce
only about 4% of the hazardous wastes in California, these industries
are responsible for almost 12% of all toxic metal wastes generated there
(California Toxic Waste Assessment Group, 1981). Changes in control
requirements, standards, or treatment and disposal costs associated with
these wastes could significantly affect these industries.
Because quality control in both the PV and semiconductor industries
demands high-purity plating solutions, plating solutions that are no
longer suitable for these industries may still be adequate for other
industrial plating operations. Spent plating wastes may be reclaimed
for sale to industries not requiring high-purity solutions. Wastes that
cannot be recycled internally or reclaimed for other uses, however, must
be disposed of under RCRA guidelines. Specific wastes may require chem-
ical treatment prior to disposal and some wastes may be disposed of
either by chemical treatment or by secure Class I landfill disposal.
Chemical treatment costs for toxic metals average $250 per ton nation-
ally. Class I disposal costs vary from $60 to $120 per ton in
California depending upon toxicity (Kettleman/BKK, 1983; California
Toxic Waste Assessment Group, 1981). Cost impact associated with plat-
ing waste disposal is undetermined.
2. Thick-Film Print
Wafers are metallized beginning with the back surface. Aluminum,
silver or copper ink is applied to the surface through a mesh screen with a
squeegee roller. They are dried and sintered at 550°C, then returned to the
printer for the same process to apply a front grid pattern using silver or
molybdenum/tin/titanium ink. This process may not be suitable for very thin
silicon-sheet wafers (ribbons, for example) because these thin wafers become
stressed when the thick film is sintered. Thick-film inks contain valuable
metals which will probably be reclaimed for their salvage value.
E,H&S Concern: Occupational exposure to metal inks via inhalation.
Assessment: Analysis of several silver inks used for metallization
indicates the presence of significant levels of toxic metals other than
silver, including lead, nickel, and antimony. A sample survey of one
semiconductor plant having in-place control technology showed that pro-
cess operators were exposed to silver levels above OSHA standards (U.S.
Department of Labor, 1979). According to RCRA, antimony, lead, nickel,
and silver are considered hazardous constituents in a waste stream.
Based on the sample survey, it was concluded that controls or procedures
to prevent occupational exposure to those materials may be either inade-
quate or improperly executed. With inclusion of metal inks under RCRA
guidelines, controls and monitoring of exposure to metal inks are
expected to become more stringent. Development of more effective or
stricter enforcement of in-place control technologies may be required to
meet existing standards. Cost impacts associated with control and
treatment of metal inks are undetermined.
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3. Evaporation
Prior to metallization, photoresist patterned wafers are placed in
a vacuum chamber. Titanium metal is heated in a small boat, and the evapor-
ated metal is then deposited as a fine mist onto the wafers where it solidi-
fies on contact. Titanium, palladium, and copper or silver are deposited in
sequence on the wafer. Excess metal condensed on the chamber walls is hand-
scraped for recycling.
E,H&S Concern: Potential occupational exposure to metal wastes via
inhalation or other contact.
Assessment: Cleaning methods for large-scale evaporation processes have
not been determined. E.H&S concerns associated with cleaning an evapor-
ative vacuum chamber will depend upon the cleaning method employed and
associated occupational hazards. It is not known whether occupational
exposure to metals will be a problem for large-scale operations.
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Prior to deposition of the antiref lective (AR) coating, wafers are
cleaned in dilute (10%) hydrofluoric acid to remove trace solvents and metal.
Wafers are given an antiref lective coating to decrease loss of sunlight due to
reflection. An AR coating is typically applied in one of three ways: chemical
vapor deposition, liquid coating, or evaporation.
1. Chemical Vapor Deposition
A diffusion furnace is used for chemical deposition of silicon
nitride (Si3N^ ) using dichlorosilane and ammonia as deposition gases in an
automated process. Dichlorosilane, ammonia, hydrochloric acid, and hydrogen
are effluent gases (Gallagher, 1983).
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E,H&S Concern: Occupational exposure to toxic and volatile dichlorosi-
lane and hydrochloric-acid gas via inhalation.
Assessment: See discussion in Section II.B.2.
E,H&S Concern: Occupational exposure to silicon nitride reactant pro-
ducts via inhalation.
Assessment: Diffusion reactor tubes must be periodically cleaned with a
hot etchant gas such as hydrochloric acid. Workers may be exposed to
silicon nitride or its reactant products. Although silicon nitride is
reportedly stable, its toxicity and the toxicity of its reactant pro-
ducts have not been determined. Until toxicity has been determined,
precautions should be taken to minimize worker exposure to these mate-
rials. Future control requirements and associated control costs are
undetermined.
2. Liquid Coating
A semiautomated conveyer belt is loaded with wafers that are
sprayed or meniscus-coated with titanium isopropoxide [Ti (OC£ ^ 5^)4]
and air-flashed to remove bubbles. The wafers are then infrared dried and
fired at 200°C. In another liquid AR coating process, wafers are dipped into
a bath of titanium isopropoxide and then oven dried. When solvents are driven
from the coating material, titanium dioxide remains.
E,H&S Concern: E,H&S concerns associated with this process are not
expected to be significant because fumes produced are minimal, and sys-
tem ventilation and automatic shutoffs are adequate to prevent acci-
dental leaks into the workplace.
3. Evaporation
A similar evaporative metal deposition process is used for metalli-
zation and antireflective coating, except that tantalum metal replaces titan-
ium, palladium, and copper.
E,H&S Concern: Potential occupational exposure to metal wastes via
inhalation or other contact.
Assessment: See discussion in Section II.F.3.
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Following a final cleaning, the finished PV cells are ready to be
assembled into operative PV modules. Finished PV cells are tested, intercon-
nected, encapsulated, and assembled into a module. The finished modules are
then tested to verify performance.
1. Cell Interconnection Substep
In an automated process, cells are aligned and interconnect tabs
are soldered into place on the front and back of each cell. An assembly of
cells is fed to a solder reflow oven and assembled into a string. Strings are
then assembled into a module tray where interconnect tabs are placed on inter-
connect buses and soldered.
E,H&S Concern; Occupational exposure to metal solders via inhalation
and ingestion.
Assessment; Lead/tin solder and zinc chloride flux are used during the
interconnection process. Although occupational exposure to metal
solders seemed to be well within OSHA standards for this operation,
semiconductor industry workers were found to have body burdens of these
metals higher than expected based on potential exposure (U.S. Department
of Labor, 1979). The Semiconductor Safety Division (SSD), a voluntary
organization of E,H&S professionals within the industry-sponsored Semi-
conductor Industry Association (SIA), has determined that the primary
mode of employee exposure to metals was from smoking and consuming
coffee and food within the work area (SSD, 1982). Metals were inhaled
and/or ingested after cups, food, and cigarettes had been contaminated
by the employee's gloved hands. It may be concluded that protective
equipment is being used inadequately, industrial hygiene protocol is not
observed, or protection equipment is inappropriately engineered to
maximize protection in the worker environment.
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2. Encapsulation and Module Fabrication Substep
Flat-plate modules are encapsulated against a glass substrate.
Ethylene vinyl acetate (EVA) is applied to the glass sheet and the cell assem-
bly is placed on top. An encapsulant cover is placed on the assembly and a
sheet of mylar is added. The sandwiched assembly is baked in a double-
chambered vacuum laminator or an autoclave to seal it. Concentrator modules
are fabricated with plastic Fresnel lenses and are typically not as exten-
sively encapsulated.
E,H&S Concern; Occupational exposure to EVA fumes via inhalation.
Assessment: Modules are autoclaved under a partial vacuum; conse-
quently, potential occupational exposure to fumes should be minimal.
The combustion products of EVA have not been determined, but potential
emissions include acetic acid, carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, and
monomer constituents. EVA is a copolymer of polyethylene and vinyl
chloride, the latter a known human carcinogen and a RCRA toxic waste.
Vinyl chloride is also a fire and explosion hazard. It is not known
whether vinyl chloride is an EVA combustion product. Therefore, unless
it is determined that vinyl chloride is not an EVA combustion product,
precautions should be taken to minimize worker exposure to these fumes.
If toxicity is demonstrated, strict OSHA and possibly RCRA exposure stan-
dards will probably be established. The associated control costs are
undetermined. To date, no Federal standards exist regarding occupa-
tional exposure to EVA fumes.
3. Cell and Module Testing and Handling Substep
Finished cells and modules are tested to demonstrate function and
to rate their performance by exposure to simulated sunlight. Following test-
ing, modules are packaged and transported for system installation at the job
site (system deployment is addressed in subsequent sections of this report).
E,H&S Concern: Occupational shock hazard from factory-assembled PV
arrays.
Assessment; PV modules produce nearly full voltage even under very low
levels of illumination. Thus, the modules are always "on". Shock
hazard is a function of module voltage. With most present-day modules,
this concern is negligible because of low module voltage (Rabinowitz,
1982). For centralized system applications, however, modules may be
factory-assembled into larger sized panels or arrays, with voltages high
enough (greater than 30 volts dc) to present a significant electrocution
hazard. An uninformed worker who is testing, handling, or transporting
finished arrays could be seriously injured or even killed by an
accidental shock. Module and array labeling, packaging, and shipping
requirements that adequately protect individuals from shock hazards are
now being addressed by Underwriters Laboratory Inc. (UL) for JPL.
25
I. NON-SILICON PHOTOVOLTAIC COLLECTOR MANUFACTURING
Many semiconducting materials exhibit the PV effect and may be used in
PV collectors. Currently, and in the near future, commercially available
modules will be limited chiefly to crystalline silicon. In the future, how-
ever, PV collectors may employ any of several promising "thin-film" materials
now being researched, including amorphous silicon, cadmium telluride, copper-
indium diselenide, zinc phosphide, gallium arsenide, or cadmium sulfide/copper
sulfide (U.S. Department of Energy, 1983). The techniques used to make thin-
film cells include vacuum evaporation, glow discharge, reactive sputtering,
and chemical vapor deposition.
E,H&S Concern; Advanced "thin-film" processing techniques have not been
assessed to determine potential associated E,H&S concerns.
Assessment; With the exception of gallium arsenide and cadmium sulfide/
copper sulfide, collectors based on "thin-film" materials presently may
be made only with advanced processing techniques. The E,H&S concerns
associated with those processes have not yet been assessed. Thin-film
processes are inherently attractive because of their low material con-
sumption, low temperature process requirements, and their potential for
continuous, large-volume, low-cost PV collector production. Undesirable
and costly waste streams such as etchant or plating wastes may be
replaced by wastes of undetermined toxicity from new processes. Control
technology requirements and costs associated with thin-film processes
cannot be determined until these processes and their waste streams have
been characterized and the relative hazardousness or toxicity of efflu-
ents determined. The presence of highly toxic and/or hard-to-control
effluents could indicate prohibitive control technology costs which
would affect the viability of technologies based on certain PV collector
materials .
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SECTION III
RESIDENTIAL PHOTOVOLTAIC SYSTEM DEPLOYMENT
SUMMARY MATRIX
This section discusses E,H&S concerns associated with residential system
deployment. Compared with module fabrication processes, issues associated
with residential deployment are less well understood because experience with
operating systems is limited. The following matrix (Table 2) summarizes the
residential system phases, identifies the E,H&S concerns associated with each
phase, and summarizes the assessment of those concerns. Residential PV system
deployment includes system construction and operation. Off-normal events,
particularly those which may result in fire, are also included in this section.
Table 2. Environmental, Health, and Safety Concerns Associated with
Roof-Mounted, Residential Photovoltaic System Deployment
Process Step E.H&S Concern(s)
Assessment
(cost impacts are
undetermined)
A. System Construction -Public and occupational
shock hazard from modules/
arrays
B. System Operation -Public and occupational
shock hazard
-Flammability of the PV
array
-Occupational and public
exposure to toxic PV com-
bustion fumes
-Public and occupational
populations are un-
familiar with PV
-Compliance with pro-
jected codes and stand-
ards will mitigate most
but not all present
safety concerns
-Public and occupa-
tional populations are
unfamiliar with PV
-Uniform operation and
maintenance guidelines
and safety procedures
are presently unavail-
able
-Requirements for
module fire resistance
being developed will
mitigate present
concerns
-Toxicity and safe ex-
posure levels are
unknown
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Because of the modular nature of PV modules and panels, PV systems can
be tailored to any size. Residential systems will typically be in the 2 to
8 kWp size range and may be either independent of, or connected to, the
utility grid. Residential systems may be roof or ground mounted, although
roof-mounted systems will probably predominate because existing roof members
can be used for the array support structure. Concentrator arrays and tracking
flat-plate systems will probably not be used in near-term residential appli-
cations because they occupy more space than fixed flat-plate arrays and
require more complex support structures in order to track the sun.
Residential systems may be installed as a part of new construction or
may be added as retrofit systems to existing homes. There are four basic
mounting schemes (see Figure 2) by which a roof-mounted system may be
installed: direct, integral, standoff, and rack (Burt Hill Kosar Rittelman
Associates, 1979). Direct and integral mounting schemes are especially suit-
able for new construction because the PV modules replace standard shingles or
other roofing material. Standoff and rack mounting schemes may also be used
in new construction, but are especially suitable for retrofit construction
because the system can be positioned at an optimal angle with respect to the
sun.
Residential systems will be installed by local building contractors
and/or electricians. System diagnostics, repair, and major maintenance will
be performed by trained service personnel. The homeowner may undertake cer-
tain limited maintenance activities, such as keeping the array clear of debris
and vegetation. Residential PV system deployment includes system construction
and operation; system maintenance is part of the operational phase.
A. SYSTEM CONSTRUCTION
Whether new or retrofit, residential PV system construction begins with
delivery of components to the job site. Upon delivery, PV components are
inspected for shipping damage and the modules tested to verify their electri-
cal and structural integrity. Once inspected and tested, components may be
stored until installation. To install the PV system, individual modules or
field-wired panels are attached and secured to the roof structure, and array
wiring is completed. The power conditioner is installed, and interface wir-
ing, and protective devices, such as overcurrent and lightning surge protec-
tion, system grounding, manual disconnect switches, are connected to complete
the system. The finished system is inspected by local authorities and is
checked out according to a prescribed sequence to verify proper system opera-
tion, safety, and electrical performance (Forman and Klein, 1982; Jet Propul-
sion Laboratory, 1983).
E,H&S Concern: PV modules, individually or as part of a system, may
present a shock hazard condition to public and occupational populations.
Assessment: PV modules are electrically active when exposed to any
light source; hence, they are always "on". A partially assembled system
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DIRECT INTEGRAL
STANDOFF RACK
Figure 2. Four Basic Array Mounting Schemes
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or a fully assembled system under low illumination may generate lethal
voltages (Rabinowitz, 1982).
Many safety concerns associated with construction of residential
systems are addressed by various codes and standards. The most widely
adopted set of electrical requirements is the National Electrical Code
(NEC). Until recently (1983), PV installation requirements were not
addressed by any code or standard. Since then, the NEC has been revised
and will address PV systems in Article 690 of the 1984 edition of the
Code (NFPA, 1982). To further minimize safety concerns associated with
fire, shock and casualty, UL has developed a Standard for Safety for
flat-plate PV modules and panels (UL, 1982). The requirements of the
NEC and the UL standard are interrelated; the UL standard addresses the
factory-built item and the NEC addresses the system installation. The
UL standard and the NEC describe levels of safety considered appropriate
for product construction and installation that afford practical
safeguarding of persons and property arising from the generation and use
of PV electricity.
For the near term, most new systems will be custom designs built by
an industry with relatively limited experience in PV and constructed
from components that are new to the home construction industry. Comply-
ing with the NEC provisions and UL requirements will ensure that most PV
electrical safety concerns have been addressed.
At present there is no network of trained PV installers or service
personnel. Because of PV's unique operating characteristics, inexperi-
enced workers will require informational assistance until practical
experience with PV can be gained. Informational assistance, e.g., spe-
cific system design and installation manuals from the system designer or
generic technical information based on experience derived from National
PV Program system experiments, will assist in the development of instal-
lation, operation and maintenance guidelines that protect PV hardware,
the residence, the occupants, and the workers. Programmatic PV residen-
tial design documentation is under preparation and may be expanded to
address design-specific safety concerns by the emerging residential PV
industry (Sandia National Laboratories, Photovoltaic Residential Design
Documentation Task).
B. SYSTEM OPERATION
Residential PV system operation activities include routine operation and
maintenance. As stated previously, homeowner maintenance responsibilities
should be minimal. Maintenance activities that should be performed only by
trained service personnel include array washing, performance checks, system
diagnostics in the event of system malfunction, and repair and/or replacement
of damaged components including array modules.
Although not a part of normal system operation and maintenance, off-
normal events and the subsequent emergency conditions may present increased
30
hazard both to occupants of the residence and to emergency response
personnel. Off-normal events consist of man-made and natural disasters,
including fires and earthquakes.
E,H&S Concern: Electric shock hazard conditions from the system during
maintenance activity.
Assessment: Because a PV system is electrically active whenever illumi-
nated, service personnel must be expected to work on a live system.
Although in some cases subsystem components can be electrically isolated
and/or voltages reduced to safe levels, the array subsystem cannot be
completely turned off. Service personnel new to PV maintenance and
"do-it-yourself" homeowners attempting to troubleshoot and repair their
own systems risk electrical shock. Mechanisms by which a shock may
occur have been examined but are not well understood (Sugimura, 1983).
Limiting access to high-voltage components and provision of labels,
warnings, and posted instructions will reduce some of the risk associ-
ated with this concern. As with other electrical products, it is
unlikely that all conceivable shock hazards associated with the opera-
tion and maintenance of PV systems can be prevented if the system is to
retain its utility.
E,H&S Concern: Flammability of the PV array.
Assessment; Residential system concerns associated with array/module
flammability involve two distinct risk areas: (1) the likelihood or
ability of a module to ignite itself from an electrical arc and then
lead to flame spreading beyond the arc site, and (2) the likelihood or
ease of a module being ignited by an external flame source such as a
flying ember or burning brand. These factors affect the flammability of
a roof, and are especially important where local restrictions apply.
Residential roof-mounted arrays constitute a sensitive application
class because the operating voltage and current levels are sufficient
for sustained arcs, and the array is in close proximity to other flam-
mable elements which can serve as a source to ignite the array or fuel
the flames. More important, the array is likely to be close to person-
nel, so that risk to human life is involved.
Most residential building codes have no quantitative requirements
for flame resistance of materials, but the modules will generally have
to be listed (NEC, 1984), certified as being reasonably safe, by a
nationally recognized testing organization such as UL. This listing
requires insensitivity to ignition from arcs, but not from external
flame sources. Product liability guidelines simply suggest that a PV
array should not present an unreasonable or unexpected fire hazard. One
interpretation is that a PV roof-mounted array should be no more
flammable than a typical wood shingle or shake roof.
Fire-rated applications is a category that involves arrays where
fire risks are high and specific fire-resistance levels have been esta-
blished. Examples include public buildings and residential roofs in
specific communities with a high fire-risk concern. The National Fire
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Protection Association (NFPA), in conjunction with UL and the American
Society for Testing Materials (ASTM), has established three classes: A,
B and C; A being the most fire resistant, followed by B and C. The
requirements and test procedures defining these ratings are presented in
Safety Standards, such as UL Standard No. 790.
Comparison of the fire-resistance requirements of residential PV
applications with the measured capabilities of the leading candidate
module constructions indicates that the two are generally consistent.
Additional activities, however, are being carried out to further clarify
the issues. These include: (1) additional testing of materials, such
as EVA, to verify their ability to meet the requirements of module list-
ing for typical non-fire-rated applications; (2) definition of technical
parameters required to prevent arc-initiated fires; and (3) experimenta-
tion with low-cost means of improving fire resistance of candidate
module constructions (Sugimura, 1983).
E,H&S Concern; Exposure to toxic PV combustion products via inhalation
in the event of a residential fire.
Assessment; In the event of a residential fire involving a PV roof
array system, off-gassing of toxic fumes has been identified as a poten-
tial health hazard (Neff, 1979; Weinstein and Meeker, 1981). Current
manufacturing techniques favor ethylene vinyl acetate (EVA) as an encap-
sulant material. As discussed previously (Section II.I.I), few data are
available on the toxicity of EVA combustion products. Firefighters who
are routinely exposed to toxic combustion products employ air-filtering
masks, self-contained breathing apparatus, and other safety equipment to
protect them from potential exposure to harmful materials. If EVA com-
bustion fumes are determined to be toxic, firefighters may still experi-
ence some chronic low-level exposure to these fumes because current
residential firefighting equipment does not provide total protection.
Residents are exposed to only negligible amounts of toxic combustion
fumes because home fires are typically isolated incidents.
Currently, and in the near future, residential PV collector mate-
rials will be limited to silicon. PV modules in the future, however,
may contain materials such as gallium arsenide, cadmium sulfide/copper
sulfide, cadmium telluride, zinc phosphide, or copper-indium disele-
nide. Many of the advanced collector materials contain acutely hazar-
dous or toxic substances, giving rise to additional health concerns. In
the event of fire in residences having PV systems based on advanced
materials, firefighters could be chronically and repeatedly exposed to
toxic heavy metals. It seems unlikely that the public will be exposed
to dangerous levels of these materials during a single residential fire
(Moskowitz, et al., 1980). Potential off-gassing, toxicity, and public
and occupational exposure to certain PV collector materials and cell
material options have not been investigated. The presence of toxic
and/or flammable PV combustion products could affect the viability of
technologies based on certain PV collector materials.
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SECTION IV
CENTRAL-STATION SYSTEM DEPLOYMENT
SUMMARY MATRIX
This section discusses E,H&S concerns associated with central-station
system deployment. Although these issues may not prove to be significant, it
is significant that many of these concerns are not well understood and have
not been completely assessed because of limited experience within this
application area.
The matrix shown in Table 3 summarizes central-station system phases,
identifies the E,H&S concerns associated with each phase, and summarizes the
assessment of those concerns. Central-station system deployment includes
system construction and operation. Off-normal events, especially those which
may result in fire, are also included in this section.
Central-station PV systems are large, ground mounted, typically utility
owned, and grid connected. Centralized systems may range in size from 1 MW
to 100 MWD or larger. Depending upon local terrain, insolation, collector
efficiency, and system design, centralized systems require approximately 2 to
4 hectares of land per MWp (Patten, 1980). Because the collector arrays for
large systems require substantial land areas, many future scenarios assume
that large systems will be built predominately in desert locations because of
relatively low land costs and high insolation levels. Realistically, central-
ized PV systems will be placed in any geographic region where competing con-
ventional energy costs, social acceptance, and land availability make them
feasible. Photovoltaic plant sites favorable from the utility perspective may
eventually encompass a wide range of ecosystems and geographic regions.
There are three design options for central-station arrays; fixed flat-
plate, tracking flat-plate, and concentrator designs (Figure 3). Each option
has certain advantages and tradeoffs.
Central-station system deployment includes system construction and oper-
ation. System construction requires site preparation prior to system instal-
lation, while system operation encompasses routine operation and maintenance.
Special operations are required in the event of off-normal events or
emergencies.
A. SYSTEM CONSTRUCTION
Central-station system construction begins with site preparation. Site
preparation is followed by component delivery, system installation, and system
startup and checkout. Site preparation includes, where necessary, removal of
vegetation and obstructions to construction, surface grading, and
re-surfacing. Building of service and access roads and construction support
buildings is also a part of site preparation.
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Table 3. Environmental, Health, and Safety Concerns Associated with
Ground-Mounted, Central-Station Photovoltaic System Deployment
System Phase E.H&S Concern(s)
Assessment
(cost impacts are
undetermined)
A. System Construction -Environmental disruption
of large land areas
—Occupational shock hazards
from arrays/system
B. System Operation
1. Routine
Operation
2. Routine Main-
tenance
3. Off-normal
events resulting
in fire
-Ecological disruption from
presence of PV system
-Climatological disruption
from presence of PV system
-Occupational shock hazards
from arrays/system
-Water demand for array
cleaning in water-defi-
cient areas
-Environmental disruption
from vegetation control
-Flammability of the PV
array
-Public and occupational
exposure to toxic PV
combustion products
-Fire hazards from power
conditioner chemical spills
-Alteration of standard
construction practices
may reduce this concern
-Guidelines for large
system construction
are being developed
-Occupational popula-
tions are unfamiliar
with PV
-Impacts and methods of
mitigation are un-
known
-Impacts and methods of
mitigation are un-
known
-Operation and mainten-
ance guidelines are
being developed
-Standard washing tech-
niques may be too
water-consumptive in
some areas
-Insignificant with
proper procedures
-Probably not signifi-
cant; detailed studies
are in progress
-Toxicity and safe ex-
posure levels are un-
known
-Insignificant with
proper siting
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Following site preparation, the PV system components are delivered to
the site and, as necessary, stored prior to installation. As in residential
system construction, the system components are checked for damage upon
delivery and the PV modules or factory-assembled panels or arrays are tested
to verify electrical integrity. The array field and associated support com-
ponents including the power conditioning and transformer units are then
installed. The power plant service buildings are also constructed at this
time. The system is inspected by the utility against prescribed specifica-
tions at key points during system construction. Following installation the
system is put through a prescribed sequence of startup and checkout to verify
proper installation and electrical performance and to test safety and control
functions.
E,H&S Concern: Site preparation and system construction disrupt large
land areas and their associated ecosystems.
Assessment: Centralized PV facilities use large land areas. Ground-
mounted, fixed flat-plate PV array fields require a minimum of about
2 hectares per MWp, given optimal insolation, terrain, and collector
efficiencies greater than 10%. Concentrator and tracking flat-plate
array fields require approximately 30% more area because array shadowing
must be minimized to maximize the benefits of a tracking system (Burt
Hill Kosar Rittelman, 1982). When land required for access roads and
service buildings is added to array field requirements, these areas
increase. Construction activities damage and disrupt the physical ter-
rain and local ecosystems. The severity and extent of disruption due to
construction depends largely upon the fragility of the ecosystem and the
amount of land required.
Early designs for central-station systems typically included stan-
dard site preparation, which involves land clearing, grubbing, grading,
and artificial re-surfacing. However, even systems that can use a site
in its natural state will alter land and ecosystems by array installa-
tion, service building construction, road building, and off-road vehicle
traffic. Environmental impacts of large-scale land use in desert loca-
tions could be considerable. Wind erosion would increase because the
protective desert crust, or pavement, would be broken. The effects of
water erosion would also increase. Fragile, thin-layer ecosystems typi-
cal of desert environments require decades to recover from construction
activities (Turner, 1979, 1980). Less delicate ecosystems usually
recover more rapidly. System sites will probably be chosen to avoid
dense wildlife populations and areas where fragile land or ecosystems
would be significantly impacted by construction activities.
E,H&S Concern: Electrical shock hazards are associated with central-
station system installation.
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Assessment: In general, workers constructing a utility-sized system are
likely to be aware of the hazards associated with PV, especially if
appropriate cautions are incorporated into working plans and procedures
prepared for system installation. Depending upon the system design and
module technology chosen, workers may wire modules into panels and
arrays at the job-site, or factory-assembled panels or arrays may be
installed directly. Although workers are expected to be familiar with
the hazards associated with PV and, accordingly, are expected to follow
safe work practices, they must ultimately work with potentially hazar-
dous voltages.
A detailed risk assessment of occupational hazards associated with
central-station deployment, which includes operation and maintenance in
addition to installation, has not been performed to date. Within the
National PV Program, no centralized systems of sufficient size have yet
been operated on which to base an analysis. Because of savings due to
economies of scale, use of automated machinery, and worker familiarity
with PV, centralized systems may present fewer occupational risks per
killowatt-installed than residential systems.
B. SYSTEM OPERATION
Central-station PV system operation activities include routine operation,
routine maintenance, and emergency activities associated with off-normal
events, especially fire.
1. Routine Operation
Routine operation activities involve plant monitoring and control
(i.e., daily startup, shutdown, grid synchronization, and equipment monitor-
ing), security, and communications. Although some hazards are associated with
each of these activities, none is inherently unique to PV. Also, many of
these plant operation activities are automatic; hence, the risk associated
with many tasks is negligible.
E,H&S Concern: Ecological disruption because of the presence of a PV
system.
Assessment: Local ecosystems may react, either positively, negatively,
or not at all depending upon geographic region, to the presence of an
installed array field. Collectors covering approximately 50% of the
ground surface block from 50 to 80% of the daily incoming solar radia-
tion, depending on the season. Modification of surface wind flow, sur-
face temperatures, and evapotranspiration rates within the array field
are seen because of the presence of an array canopy (Hanks, et al.,
1967). Biota in desert locations could exhibit a positive response to
these changes within the array field microenvironment because shading
conserves deep soil moisture (Smith, 1981). A decrease in available
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sunlight for desert plants may not inhibit growth under most circum-
stances. In humid ecosystems, however, the reduction in available sun-
light may limit plant growth although the adverse impact that shading
creates in this case is not expected to be significant.
Plans for large solar facilities in the arid southwestern United
States must recognize that most of this arid region suffers from blowing
dust and sand during one or more yearly seasons. For hydrological and
economic reasons, resurfacing large land areas is impractical, yet sur-
faces beneath the collector canopy must be stabilized. Environmentally
and economically, arid regions benefit when vegetation is allowed to
remain within the array field. Land surfaces are stabilized by native
vegetation which, in turn, benefits from supplemental water within the
array field.
ErH&S Concern; Potential climatological disruption because of the pres-
ence of a PV system. ~
Assessment: It has been speculated that very large central-station PV
power plants (greater than or equal to about 100 MWp) may alter local
climates by modifying the surrounding solar radiation balance. Array
shading can cause changes in ground surface albedo, thermal conductivity,
heat capacity, emissivity, and other surface characteristics. Suffici-
ently large changes in these characteristics could lead to climatologi-
cal disruption including the formation of localized thunderstorms, and
alteration of wind and rainfall patterns (Ehumralkar, et al., 1979,
1980).
2. Routine Maintenance
Maintenance activities on central-station PV facilities involve
array cleaning, module and subsystem performance testing, diagnostics in the
event of malfunction, repair and/or replacement of failed modules, maintenance
of power conditioners and other electrical subsystems, adjustment to and main-
tenance of tracking mechanisms for concentrator and tracking flat-plate sys-
tems, road maintenance, and grounds maintenance.
E,H&S Concern; Electric shock from the system during maintenance
operations .
Assessment; Maintenance operations on PV central-station facilities may
require the handling of electrically active elements. Maintenance is
hazardous since arrays operate at lethal voltages, even under low-level
light conditions. Hazards arising from maintenance activities may
include shocks from accidental contact with live components, burns from
handling overheated arrays, cuts from broken glass and injuries incurred
by a fall. Concentrator and tracking flat-plate systems introduce risks
instead of, or in addition to, those associated with fixed flat-plate
system maintenance because of the additional tracking mechanism.
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Because concentrator systems may be defocused for maintenance activi-
ties, the risk of receiving a severe shock from the live system is sub-
stantially reduced. Photovoltaic systems using resistance-grounded
circuits may reduce electrical shock hazard potential to safe levels.
Insufficient experimental data and experience have been gathered on
which to base firm operation and maintenance requirements. As stated
previously, no large centralized systems have yet been operated within
the National PV Program. Safety procedures for maintenance operations
were specifically written for the 25-kWp Mead, Nebraska, prototype
facility because of its uniqueness and the previous lack of safety regu-
lations addressing PV systems (Forman and Landsman, 1978). However, the
Mead prototype differs substantially in design from concentrator and
newer flat-plate systems. Some electrical safety problems associated
with system maintenance are addressed by UL standards. Operation and
maintenance guidelines and recommended safety practices for central-
station PV applications are currently being developed.
E,H&S Concern: Increased water demand for array cleaning purposes in
water-deficient regions.
Assessment: Frequency of array cleaning and subsequent water use is
determined, in part, by the environmental setting of the array field and
the regional precipitation which may contribute to, or in some areas
eliminate the need for, array cleaning. Array surfaces are subject to
soiling by a variety of contaminants including common dust, sand, plant
volatiles, bird excrement, and oily hydrocarbons from airborne pollu-
tants. The extent of soiling by these contaminants will depend upon the
location of the array field and the condition of the surrounding ground
surface. For example, an unstabilized ground surface will contribute to
array soiling by sand and dust, and an array proximate to a large metro-
politan area will be subject to a higher degree of pollutant soiling.
Soil, including oily hydrocarbons, may be removed by a mild detergent
wash (many non-foaming, non-toxic, biodegradable solvents are available)
followed by an ordinary tap water rinse (Hoffman and Maag, 1980).
Cleaning water may be reclaimed and reused to some extent; however, a
certain percentage (up to 40%) is lost by evaporation. The impact that
increased water demand will have in water-deficient regions is site and
design-specific. Availability and competing demand for water must be
taken into consideration when siting large PV facilities in arid
regions. The impact of PV-related water use on facility siting has not
been assessed.
E,H&S Concern: Environmental disruption because of vegetation control
measures.
Assessment: If natural vegetation is left intact during site prepara-
tion and array installation operations, then some degree of vegetation
control may be necessary to prevent interference with system operation.
Tracking mechanisms may be especially vulnerable to vegetative fouling,
depending upon structure height and type of indigenous vegetation.
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Vegetation control is not unique to PV. Fire breaks, transmission cor-
ridors, and unpaved access roads typically must be kept clear. Manual,
mechanical, or chemical (i.e., herbicides) methods of control are avail-
able. Array shading may limit plant growth in some regions (e.g., tem-
perate zones) while, conversely, growth rates may be so slow that vege-
tative fouling is not a problem in other regions (e.g., arid zones).
Environmental concerns associated with vegetation control within the PV
array field will probably be insignificant.
3. Off-Normal Events Resulting in Fire
Off-normal events, consisting of man-made or natural disasters, include
major fires and earthquakes. Although not a part of normal system operation
and maintenance, the possible consequences of these events may require subse-
quent emergency activities such as firefighting and emergency treatment of
personnel.
E,H&S Concern: Flammability of the PV array.
Assessment: Central-station concerns associated with array/module flam-
mability, as in the residential case, involve both module self-ignition
from an electrical arc and ignition from an external source.
Central-station applications will generally involve system voltages
above 200 volts, well above the minimum level for sustained arcing.
Electrical arcs because of ground faults are expected periodically, so
the modules must prevent the damage from spreading beyond the arc site.
In addition, the array must be modestly resistant to ignition from
external sources such as flying embers.
Comparison of the fire-resistance requirements of central-station
PV applications with the measured capabilities of present configurations
indicates that the two are generally consistent. In addition to the
previously described activities to clarify remaining array flammability
issues (see Section III.3), efforts are continuing to further define the
flammability requirements of central-station applications (Sugimura,
1983).
E,H&S Concern: Exposure to toxic PV combustion products by occupational
and public populations via inhalation.
Assessment: Significant health and environmental hazards may be associ-
ated with the release of large amounts of PV collector combustion pro-
ducts in the event of a major facility fire. Flat-plate encapsulant and
concentrator lens materials are flammable, but the toxicity of their
combustion products has not been determined. In addition, certain
advanced collector materials contain identified acutely hazardous
substances which can contaminate collector combustion fumes even if
encapsulants and concentrator lenses are found non-toxic. Potential
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toxicity, downwind magnitude, and public and occupational exposure to
various PV collector combustion products which may be released during a
major facility fire are unassessed. The presence of toxic and/or flam-
mable PV combustion products may affect the viability of technologies
based on certain PV collector materials for this application or the
suitability of central PV systems in certain locations.
E,H&S Concern: Potential fire safety hazards associated with accidental
power-conditioner fluid spills.
Assessment: In general, high-voltage power conditioners used in
central-station PV systems will contain oil-based dielectric fluids.
Dielectric fluids now used have low toxicity, high rates of biodegrad-
ability, and are somewhat flammable (Westin, 1979). A dielectric fluid
spill from utility-sized power conditioners could complicate or even
cause a fire hazard in the event of a major accident. Although the use
of dielectric-filled power conditioners and transformers is not unique
to PV, there is moderate reason for concern about power-conditioner
placement and fluid spill prevention because of the flammability of
certain PV collector materials (see preceding E,H&S concern).
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SECTION V
SYSTEM DECOMMISSIONING
SUMMARY MATRIX
This section addresses the E,H&S concerns associated with residential
and central-station system decommissioning. For both residential and
centralized systems, decommissioning involves removal of the PV system from
service. Although PV systems are built to have a 20- to 30-year operating
lifetime, systems that have passed their technical or economic life must
eventually be removed. Regardless of system size, PV system decommissioning
will probably be performed by knowledgeable professionals. System
decommissioning includes electrical and structural dismantlement of the system
and treatment or disposal of subsequent waste materials. The following matrix
(Table 4) summarizes the phases of system decommissioning, identifies the
E,H&S concerns associated with each phase, and summarizes the assessment of
those concerns.
Table 4. Environmental, Health, and Safety Concerns Associated with
Residential and Central-Station Photovoltaic System
Decommissioning
System Phase E,H&S Concern(s)
Assessment
(cost impacts are
undetermined)
A. System Dismantlement
B. Waste Management
-Occupational shock hazards
from arrays
-Ecological disruption due
to central-station system
removal
-Improper disposal of toxic
non-silicon PV materials
-System dismantlement
guidelines not yet
available
-Impacts and methods of
mitigation are unknown
-Treatment methods are
undetermined
A. SYSTEM DISMANTLEMENT
System dismantlement precedes all structural demolition. Dismantling
should follow a sequence to electrically isolate subsystems and reduce system
voltages to safe working levels according to accepted procedures.
E,H&S Concern; Electrical shock hazards to workers during system
decommissioning.
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Assessment; System dismantling is not simply the reverse of system
installation. Decommissioning involves dismantling an operational PV
system with potentially faulty components. For this reason, decommis-
sioning procedures follow a sequence which systematically reduces system
voltages to the lowest possible operating voltage. A low-voltage panel
or a single module may represent the lowest possible operating voltage
in a residential system. However, for centralized systems that may be
built from factory-assembled arrays, the lowest possible operating volt-
age may be a single, high-voltage array. Although systems will be dis-
mantled in a prescribed sequence by knowledgeable professionals, the
possibility of accidental shock cannot be avoided. Occupational shock
hazards and the means by which they may be mitigated during decommis-
sioning of high-voltage central-station systems have not been determined.
E,H&S Concern; Ecological disruption because of PV central-station
decommissioning.
Assessment; As discussed previously, central-station PV systems may
significantly disrupt land and ecosystems during their construction and
operation. The extent of initial ecological disruption will determine
the nature and severity of effects caused by decommissioning. Wholesale
clearance and soil compaction of a central-station site leave the land
resistant to future 're-establishment of natural vegetation even with
artificial revegetation. However, central-station sites in which the
natural vegetation has been allowed to remain within the array field and
for which site preparation has been kept to a minimum have a good chance
for complete recovery. Given time, these sites will eventually return
to their original state. Decommissioning quickly reverses micro-environ-
mental changes produced by array shading.
B. WASTE MANAGEMENT
Spent modules, power-conditioning equipment, and other system components
are recycled or discarded depending upon their value. Decommissioned PV sys-
tem equipment may be reused if it is functional, recycled for its recoverable
materials, or discarded. Modules destined to be reused will be packaged and
handled as new modules, whereas modules destined for recycling or disposal
will be electrically deactivated or disabled.
E,H&S Concern; Certain non-silicon PV materials are toxic and can cause
health hazards if inappropriately or incorrectly discarded.
Assessment; Disposal of decommissioned material should not pose a prob-
lem for the silicon cell technologies. Because silicon, glass, alumi-
num, and steel are common, non-toxic, and environmentally inert sub-
stances, ordinary landfill disposal could suffice. Landfill disposal is
relatively inexpensive. For example, 1 ton of flat-plate silicon-based
modules (about seven 8 x 20 ft^ arrays) can be disposed of by landfill
for a disposal fee of about $4 in Southern California (Los Angeles Sani-
tation District, 1983). For economic and legal reasons, disposal of
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spent PV materials may not be desirable. RCRA requires reclamation
where possible, and recycling of spent materials. Competing demand for
high-purity silicon by the semiconductor industry may also make recycl-
ing of spent PV cells economically desirable in the future.
If non-silicon PV materials such as gallium arsenide, cadmium
sulfide/copper sulfide, copper indium diselenide, cadmium telluride, or
zinc phosphide are used in PV systems, disposal may be costly. Several
of these materials contain acutely hazardous metals which, if incor-
rectly disposed of in a landfill, could be transported into, and magni-
fied by, biological systems creating health hazards. Certain non-
silicon materials may be classified as hazardous and/or restricted and
require special treatment (e.g., encapsulation or incineration) prior to
disposal. Disposal of hazardous wastes is costly. A cubic yard of
cadmium-containing modules (for example, about four 8- x 20-ft flat-
plate arrays which weigh just over one-half ton) costs about $60 in
disposal fees alone in California, even though the amount of cadmium
contained in the modules is small. Wastes containing arsenic are twice
as expensive to dispose of because they are also classified as
restricted. Disposal fees do not include the cost of special waste
treatment (BKK, 1983; Kettleman, 1983). Recycling or reclamation of
toxic PV materials may be a feasible alternative to costly hazardous
waste treatment and disposal.
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SECTION VI
POSTSCRIPT
The major E,H&S concerns presently associated with crystalline silicon
PV system manufacture and deployment options have been discussed in this
report. Early assessments of the developing PV technologies identified a
variety of potential E,H&S concerns which have not been discussed in this
report because they have been either resolved or determined to be
insignificant as a result of programmatic research or advances in the
technology. This report has been organized sequentially according to PV
life-cycle phase to aid decision makers from industry or government in deter-
mining what impact these concerns might have on their area of interest.
Although the E,H&S concerns identified in this report could be significant
with respect to cost impacts within PV, they are controllable and can be miti-
gated in several ways including process optimization, use of alternative mate-
rials and manufacturing methods, and changes in system design. The signifi-
cance of many E,H&S concerns associated with module fabrication will be a
function of material requirements per watt peak of modules produced based on
cell and module type and on module efficiency. Higher module efficiency means
lower materials consumption for the overall system per watt peak and, conse-
quently, lower waste volumes per watt peak. However, effluent volume alone
does not determine the overall relative significance of E,H&S concerns associ-
ated with a specific process, and meaningful comparisons can only be obtained
through a detailed assessment. Although a brief mention of some E,H&S con-
cerns associated with thin-film technologies is included in each section of
this report, an in-depth assessment of the E,H&S concerns associated with
those technology options will be addressed in a later report.
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SECTION VII
GLOSSARY
A. DEFINITIONS
Albedo - Reflectivity; the fraction of incident radiation at a given
wavelength (or wavelengths) reflected by a surface or body.
Alternating Current (ac) - An electric current that reverses its direc-
tion at regularly recurring intervals.
Arc - A sustained luminous discharge of electricity across a gap in a
circuit or between electrodes.
Array - A mechanically-integrated assembly of modules and panels
together with support structure and foundation, tracking, thermal con-
trol, and other components, as required to form a dc solar power-
producing unit.
Cell - The basic PV device that generates electricity when exposed to
sunlight.
Direct Current (dc) - An electric current flowing in one direction only
and having a substantially constant value.
Encapsulant - The insulating material enclosing the solar cells and cell
interconnects.
Interconnect - A conductor within a module which provides a mechanism
for conducting electricity between cells.
Metallization - Electrically conductive metal coating on the surface of
a solar cell.
Module - The smallest, complete, environmentally protected, essentially
planar assembly of solar cells, designed to generate dc power under
unconcentrated terrestrial sunlight.
Panel - A collection of modules fastened together, pre-assembled and
wired, designed to provide a field-installable unit.
Photovoltaic - The generation of an electromotive force at the boundary
between dissimilarly charged substances when exposed to light.
Photovoltaic (PV) System - The total set of components that combine to
convert solar energy into electrical energy suitable for connection to
an applicable load. The major subsystems and their interfaces are the
array, power conditioning, monitor and control, storage (where neces-
sary), cabling, and power distribution units.
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Series Paralleling - A term used to describe the module solar cell cir-
cuit configuration or the interconnection of modules to form an array.
Toxic Chemical - A material that when ingested, inhaled, or absorbed
into the body in relatively small amounts, may cause physical damage or
disturb biological function by its chemical action.
RCRA Hazardous Waste Characteristics:
Ignitable - Presents a fire or explosion hazard; temperature of vapori-
zation (flash point) lower than 60°C.
Reactive - Can cause vigorous chemical reactions when exposed to air,
water, or thermal or mechanical shocks.
Corrosive - Can destroy other materials through a chemical reaction;
wastes are usually in liquid form and the process is slow. Corrosive
wastes have a pH less than or equal to 3 or greater than or equal to 12.
Extraction Procedure (EP) Toxicity - Wastes found toxic following an
extraction test designated to identify wastes likely to leach hazardous
concentrations of toxic constituents into groundwater under conditions
of improper management.
Acute Hazardous Waste - So designated by EPA biological and chemical
testing and subsequently listed in Subpart D of RCRA. These wastes
include arsenic, cadmium, cyanide, zinc phosphide, phosphorus, and other
hazardous metal compounds.
Toxic Wastes - So designated by EPA biological and chemical testing and
subsequently listed in Subpart D of RCRA. These wastes include solvents
and other toxic organic wastes.
B. ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ACGIH American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygenists
AR Antireflective
CAA Clean Air Act
CWA Clean Water Act
DOE U.S. Department of Energy
E,H&S Environmental, Health, and Safety
EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
HF Hydrofluoric
HMTA Hazardous Materials Transport Act
JPL Jet Propulsion Laboratory
MG-Si Metallurgical-grade Silicon
NAAQS National Ambient Air Quality Standards
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NEC National Electric Code
NEPA National Environmental Policy Act
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NFPA National Fire Protection Association
NIOSH National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Act
PO Phosphorus Oxide
PV Photovoltaic(s)
RCRA Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
RF Radio Frequency
SDWA Safe Drinking Water Act
SEMI Semiconductor Equipment and Materials Institute
SG-Si Semiconductor-grade Silicon
Si Silicon
SIA Semiconductor Industry Association
SSD Semiconductor Safety Division
TCS Trichorosilane
TD&A Technology Development and Applications
TLV Toxicity Limit Value
TWA Time Weighted Average
UL Underwriters Laboratory, Inc.
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